Aadhaar Continues To Antagonize

"Aadhaar is a 12-digit unique identification (UID) number which the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is issuing for all Indian residents. The UID number is stored in a centralised database and linked to the basic demographics and biometric information – photograph, ten fingerprints and iris – of each individual." Thus spake UIDAI. 

Sounds alright, yes? Read it again, and linger an extra second over these words this time : "Centralized database", "Photographs, ten fingerprints and iris". Has the fear set in yet? No? Let me break this down for you: The same country in which an entire State's police department let vigilance complaints pile up unnoticed for 8 years because they had forgotten the password to the portal set up for exactly this purpose, is now going to host pretty much all my identification documentation on one centralized database. The sky is falling, you guys. 

But information security is just the icing on an undigestible cake. Let's start at the base. First of all, there is still no centralized list of enumeration camps where individuals can go to register for their Aadhaar card. Secondly, these camps themselves are organized by third party contractors who have seemingly been chosen at random, or at least with no credible background check on their eligibility criteria that has been made public. Thirdly -and this is the best part- the question in the Aadhaar form asking for ‘Information Sharing Consent’ has ‘Yes’ by default. You only realise after you receive the acknowledgement slip that you've just agreed to share your information. And though corrections "need to be made within 90 days", said corrections cannot be made at these enumeration camps. 

So far, so bad. But there is a silver lining, you guys. As everybody -including the merriest Indian prankster this side of the internet, Sid Vadukut-  has been pointing out, the Aadhaar card itself is being handed out like last season's jeans. From merging the National Population Register (NPR) and the Aadhaar (meaning your NPR data just gets duplicated on your Aadhaar card) to allotting no definitive proof of identification for its disbursal, the whole scheme is a bit smokes and mirrors. The system is so flawed in fact that it doesn't even have a provision for people who live in apartments. Try to input your apartment number, and the system tells you only your "house number" can be recorded. And this piece of fine plastic is going to serve as your proof of residence!  

So maybe we should just choose to look at it this way: even if somebody were to hack into the UID database and steal your information, the chances of that information being accurate is pretty small, especially if you live in a flat! (I say this lightly but you don't need a PhD to tell you that collection of pan and  passport numbers for Aadhaar application and storing them on a database on the internet without proper encryption and password protection is a recipe for theft of information and increased cyber-crime.) The small joys of the UPA's Rs. 50,000 crore flagship program!     

Last Indian Summer's Music Recco: Running Red - Kylesa 

No Aadhaar, No Achar!

I have to say I was more than a little impressed when former Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit announced last year that Delhi would be the first state to implement the national Food Security Scheme. The program would benefit 44% of the city’s population and bring 32 lakh people from the most vulnerable households-  Below Poverty Line (BPL) families, Above Poverty Line (APL) card holders, Jhuggi Ration Card (JRC) holders and beneficiaries under Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY)- would come under its purview.

“Geographically, socially and occupationally vulnerable groups such as residents of slum, resettlement colonies of F,G and H categories, notified abadi in rural village, shelter-less persons, transgenders, households with disable people, single women, children living without protection, ragpickers, unskilled construction workers, porters, casual daily wagers, and cycle rickshaw pullers will all be eligible under the scheme,” she declared. The government had already identified eligible households, and a total of 73.5 lakh people, of the city population of 1.68 crore, would benefit from the scheme, she said. Great news, right?

So imagine my surprise when I read the following headline recently: “Move to make Aadhaar mandatory must be challenged”. I had written recently about the Aadhaar card, and how it was neither a legal requirement nor have any legal or statutory authority. Though Delhi had made Aadhaar compulsory as of 1 January, 2013 for access to any government service, I distinctly remembered reading about a Supreme Court order from last September that declared that Aadhaar was not compulsory for availing social welfare benefits. So what on earth was going on?

As it turns out, the authorities had been turning down people who ought to rightfully benefit from the Food Security Scheme for not having Aadhaar cards because the Delhi government's guidelines under the Act ask for Aadhaar details for identifying the eligible households. The last date for submission of the applications for the food security card is March 15. agencies. The Delhi High Court has referred a petition against the same filed by Mr. Ram Kishan and others to a larger bench, but let’s take a look at why making Aadhaar compulsory would contradict the purpose of the Scheme.

The food security scheme works on the basis of “individual entitlement”- this means that each individual is entitled to 5 kgs of grain. So for a family of four to get their entitled amount of grain, it wouldn’t be enough for two of them to have Aadhaar cards, but all of them. You may wonder why they don’t all just get the card and be done with it, but scroll up and read the list of people who should benefit from the scheme in the former Minister’s own words again. It’s glaringly obvious that homeless people or children living without protection or even your average slum dweller will find it difficult to obtain their Aadhaar cards, simply because they won’t have the necessary identification proof or address. Add to this the problem of people with disabilities, and the fact that it’s a biometric card, and the system is clearly not feasible- the very reasons why the Supreme Court issued its order in the first place.

If the intention of the Food Security Scheme really is to feed the poorest of the poorest, to help the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised, it is vital that it does not restrict accessibility through unrealistic conditions like the Aadhaar. The scale is just too large, and poverty too rampant, for Aadhaar to be viable just yet. Hopefully, the Delhi High Court bench tasked with determining the validity of the petition against making Aadhaar compulsory to avail the Food Security Scheme will feel the same way.  

Last Indian Summer's Music Recco: Indigo Children- Sing To Me

Aadhaar for Dummies

A few days ago, Youtube channel The Liberated Indian took to the streets asking people what they know and think about the UPA government's flagship United Identification Number (UID) program, also known as Aadhaar. The results were comical. So I decided to put together a little column explaining the same. Read on.

Aadhaar - what is that, like, a mortgage?

The flash banner on the website of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UDAI) introduces  Aadhaar as “a 12-digit unique identity for every Indian individual, including children and infants”. It goes on to declare that the Aadhaar serves as proof of identity and address anywhere in India. What’s more, it’s a random number generated devoid of any classification based on caste, creed, religion and geography. Sounds pretty impressive, right?

Except, well, what the hell is the Unique Identification Authority of India?

The UDAI is an attached body of the Planning Commission of India, that was set up in February, 2009 to -you guessed it- issue Unique Identification Number (UDI) or Aadhaar to residents of India.

So it’s not for “every Indian individual”, then, as the UIDAI website puts it?

No. The Aadhaar can be issued to just about anybody residing in India, whether it be NRIs visiting relatives back home to attend a wedding or Israeli backpackers who’ve decided to prolong their  vacation and chill a little longer or even illegal refugees.

Well, if the government has a record of the address of every individual in the country, that’s good, right?      

Assuming you’re not one for Orwelian nightmares, the Aadhaar would still not a dependable database of residential addresses, simply because the Aadhaar is neither a legal requirement nor does it have any legal or statutory authority at the moment.   

Oh. Well if it’s voluntary, and has no legal authority, then it must be a low-budget pilot scheme for some distant greater good?

The jury is still out on this one, but if the UIDAI has some cohesive long-term strategy for the Aadhaar to become the norm, it’s still not very clear. What is clear however is that the Aadhaar is no low-budget pre-cursor to anything: to date, the UIDAI has spent more than Rs. 3500 crores on the Aadhaar, for a return of around 50 crore individual enrollments. In the words of Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, the taxpayers’ remittances have been spent like “baap ka paisa” on this flagship program that appears to have no discernible end game.

But what about all that “technological innovation” spiel?

Sure, if you consider data collection to be a technological innovation. Leaving aside the fact that the Aadhaar infrastructure is built on foreign technology, the Aadhaar is about as technologically superior as any large scale data collection exercise like the Census or that flashy marketing agency disguised as a “consultant” that told us so many people watched the second last over of the semi-final of the cricket world cup without blinking an eyelid or flexing their right arm or scratching their stomach. That, plus it creates a biometric database.

A biometric what? That sounds very “national security”.  

Au contraire. The biometric database makes no difference to national security or to the reduction or monitoring of crime- as in the case of a DNA database for example- because the Aadhaar itself is a voluntary exercise and I can’t imagine many Veerappan-types lining up to sign up, can you? More importantly, it poses some serious security risks to the individuals who do sign up for the Aadhaar card because (1) the agencies that collect this information appear to have been appointed almost at random with no satisfactory background checks or qualifications, and (2) have you seriously never heard the phrase “Big Brother is watching you”? Go figure it out for yourself.   

Well at least the poor people will get their benefits without difficulty.

Err, the “poor people” will get their benefits and subsidies with as little- or much- difficulty as before they came into ownership of the Aadhaar. The Aadhaar makes no difference to the allocation and distribution of benefits because the Aadhaar itself is issued based on existing ineffective forms of data such as BPL cards and other traditional ID. As a matter of fact, the cost of some services like ATM banking will increase if banks are to upgrade to biometric ATMs. In any case, the idea of a centralized system to monitor benefits is just silly because ideally, as India develops, there should be greater financial devolution of the states to let them form their own benefit schemes.

Still, it’s all pretty harmless, right?

It hasn’t killed anybody, no. But considering the difference Rs. 3,500 crore could have made to a lot of people’s lives, I’d say it’s been a big waste of public resources and a serious misallocation of funds. Also, google “Aadhaar scandal”.

Last Indian Summer's Music Recco: Propaganda - Dead Prez (Let's Get Free, 2000)